White Collar Crime: The Role Of The Firm In Occupational Crime by Soley, Sarah
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Joseph Wharton Scholars Wharton School
2017
White Collar Crime: The Role Of The Firm In
Occupational Crime
Sarah Soley
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars
Part of the Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/35
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Soley, S. (2017). "White Collar Crime: The Role Of The Firm In Occupational Crime," Joseph Wharton Scholars. Available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/35
White Collar Crime: The Role Of The Firm In Occupational Crime
Abstract
This research examines the relationships between elements of a business organization and the commission of
occupational crimes. This research hypothesizes that the factors identified by existing literature as factors
contributing to organizational crime may also contribute to occupational crime. Using the concept of the
Fraud Triangle as a framework, five aspects of corporations are identified as areas that may motivate crime,
provide opportunity for crime, or allow for the rationalization of criminal actions. This research finds that
corporate size, inadequate oversight, organizational goals, organizational morality, and compensation
structures may play a role in occupational crime. These five factors are subsequently classified as either
structural or social aspects of an organization, and a more detailed system of causal factor classification as
related to occupational crime is proposed.
Keywords
occupational crime; white collar crime; compensation; corporate structure; corporate culture
Disciplines
Business
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/35
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE ROLE OF THE FIRM IN OCCUPATIONAL CRIME 
By 
Sarah Soley 
 
 
An Undergraduate Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
JOSEPH WHARTON SCHOLARS 
 
 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
William S. Laufer 
Julian Aresty Professor, Legal Studies & Business Ethics 
 
 
THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
MAY 2017  
ABSTRACT 
This research examines the relationships between elements of a business organization and 
the commission of occupational crimes. This research hypothesizes that the factors identified by 
existing literature as factors contributing to organizational crime may also contribute to 
occupational crime. Using the concept of the Fraud Triangle as a framework, five aspects of 
corporations are identified as areas that may motivate crime, provide opportunity for crime, or 
allow for the rationalization of criminal actions. This research finds that corporate size, 
inadequate oversight, organizational goals, organizational morality, and compensation structures 
may play a role in occupational crime. These five factors are subsequently classified as either 
structural or social aspects of an organization, and a more detailed system of causal factor 
classification as related to occupational crime is proposed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This research aims to identify aspects of organizations that can potentially contribute to 
the commission of white collar crime. For years, white collar crime has flown under the radar as 
one of the most costly crimes to society. In 2016, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
estimated that the average organization loses approximately five percent of annual revenue to 
fraud. It is estimated that in one year alone, American businesses lost approximately $895 billion 
(ACFE 2016). Beyond the organizations themselves, millions of dollars are spent on compliance 
programs and prosecutorial efforts. Despite costing the American population billions of dollars 
annually, few scholars or social scientists have attempted to study the motivations behind the 
crime (Feeley 2006). The goal of this research is to make a contribution to the scholarly 
discussion surrounding white collar crime as a whole. Presently, out of the small population of 
scholars analyzing white collar crime, there is little research dedicated solely to the role of the 
victim firm in the development of occupational white collar crime. This specific topic is 
relegated to anecdotal discussion in favor of discussion regarding the psychology of the white 
collar criminals, or research surrounding corrupt organizations as a whole. Thus, this research is 
well-suited to contribute to the overall conversation surrounding occupational crime. Within the 
current overall white collar crime discussion, occupational crime conversations have taken a 
backseat to works focused on corrupt firms and organizations. 
While attempts have been made to combat white collar crime, a clear theory of how to 
prevent white collar crime within a firm has not yet been offered. Many scholars suggest reform 
through the legal system by strengthening sanctions and other punishments imposed (Feeley 
2006; Leap 2007; Geis and Meier 1977; Sutherland 1940). This research attempts to examine 
what the firm itself can do internally to help prevent white collar crime, as opposed to what can 
be done externally by legislators and society. 
The significance of this research lies within society itself, as society ought to care about 
decreasing occupational white collar crime and the overall economic cost of this type of crime. 
White collar crime is recognized by scholars to be the most costly crime in society. More 
specifically, stakeholders in corporations and businesses will care about this research because 
white collar crime has an impact on the bottom line.  Decreasing white collar crime leads to 
increased profits, which benefit stakeholders. This research will allow firms to recognize their 
weaknesses in an effort to lead firms to “plug the holes.” It is predicted that the individuals who 
will care the most about this research will be business owners and executives, onto whom white 
collar crime losses reflect. These individuals are the most motivated to prevent economic losses 
within their companies and seek out knowledgeable and actionable ways to protect their 
interests.  
This research hypothesizes that factors such as organizational culture, organizational size, 
and organizational oversight can contribute to occupational crime. This research is qualitative in 
nature, and applies the framework of the Fraud Triangle to identified factors previously 
associated with organizational crime in order to determine whether the factors can be applied to 
occupational crime as well. 
This research suggests that a better way to understand firm-related factors that contribute 
to occupational crime is through a distinction between structural and social aspects of the 
organization. Contributing factors identified within this research can be classified as those 
providing structural opportunity, structural motivation, social motivation, and social 
rationalization. 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Based on the existing literature, this research argues that certain aspects of an 
organization found to contribute to organizational crime may also contribute to occupational 
crime. Specifically, this research hypothesizes that the organizational structure of the firm, the 
social environment of the firm, and the financial structure of the firm may contribute to the 
facilitation of both organizational and occupational crime. This research combines the concept of 
the Fraud Triangle with factors previously associated with organizational crime to show that 
these three aspects of the firm provide the white collar criminal with opportunity, motivation, 
and the ability to rationalize the decision to commit an occupational offense.  
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
The Definition of White Collar Crime 
 “White Collar Crime” is a relatively new concept in the world of crime. The term itself, 
first coined by Edward Sutherland in 1939, was originally used to refer to crimes that were 
“committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation,” 
(Sutherland 1940). However, the exact definition of white collar crime is still debated within the 
field. Scholars have suggested that the classification be broken down into more specific subsets, 
namely to include crimes that the companies themselves commit. In 1977, Herbert Edelhertz, an 
influential figure in the field of white collar crime research, proposed a four-part categorical 
system to define “economic crime” – a term Edelhertz uses in place of “white collar crime” 
(Edelhertz and Overcast 1982, 141). The first category, “crimes by persons operating on an 
individual, ad hoc basis,” includes crimes such as credit card fraud, tax fraud, and charity fraud 
(Edelhertz and Overcast 1982, 141). The second category, “crimes committed in the course of 
their occupations by those operating inside…establishments in violation of their duty…to 
employer or client,” consists of crimes like computer fraud, commercial bribery, embezzlement, 
and employee theft (Edelhertz and Overcast 1982, 141). The third category, “crimes incidental 
to, and in furtherance of, business operations, but not the central purpose of the business,” 
describes crimes such as fraud against the government, code violations, and other forms of 
misrepresentation (Edelhertz and Overcast 1982, 141). Finally, Edelhertz describes his fourth 
category as “crimes as a business or as the central activity” of the organization (1982, 141). This 
category is meant to include large frauds and schemes run by an organization.  
Despite Edelhertz’s detailed classificatory system, Sutherland’s definition of white collar 
crime is still considered the most widely accepted (Eaton and Korach 2016). Most scholars tend 
to agree that the core characterizing factor of white collar crime is a violation of trust (Shichor, 
Gaines, and Ball 2002). While Sutherland’s overall definition of white collar crime is generally 
accepted, scholars have recognized the need to differentiate between different types of white 
collar crime, and thus created a simpler version of Edelhertz’s classifications. White collar crime 
now consists of two general types of crime: occupational crime and organizational crime. 
Occupational crime is classified as crimes that employees commit against a company, whereas 
organizational crime is classified as crimes that companies commit against the general public and 
consumers (Coleman 1985). Organizational crime is comprised of Edelhertz’s third and fourth 
categories, while occupational crime mainly consists of the second.  
 This research focuses on the category of occupational crime. Notably, scholars find that 
occupational crime is more prevalent at the managerial levels of companies, fitting with 
Sutherland’s original concept of white collar crime as crime being committed by those of a 
“higher class” (Coleman 1985). Losses from employee theft, and thereby losses from 
occupational crime, are estimated to be larger than all street crime losses combined (Coleman 
1985).  
Motivations of White Collar Criminals 
Because these white collar criminals tend to be individuals of a higher socioeconomic 
echelon, the motivations behind these crimes have continually been questioned by many 
scholars. The classical motivations behind “street crime” did not seem to fit with white collar 
crime. However, early research of embezzlers in the 1940s and 1950s identified living beyond 
financial means as a potential motivation to commit white collar crime (Coleman 1985). Since 
these early analyses, two different approaches have been taken in an attempt to understand the 
motivations of white collar criminals (Feeley 2006). The first is the concept that white collar 
criminals are influenced by relationships within the company. White collar criminality, not 
unlike traditional criminality, is learned (Sutherland 1940). The white collar criminal is 
influenced by relationships, situations, and social bonds (Feeley 2006). The second is an 
approach through biology, psychology, and human personality. White collar criminality stems 
from the personality of the criminal (Feeley 2006). However, the two approaches agree that there 
are a few common motivating factors that can create a society in which white collar crime 
thrives, the first being the American culture of competition (Feeley 2006). The highly 
competitive environment in American culture creates incentives for white collar criminals to 
commit crimes to get ahead. In environments where a lack of success is seen as failure, 
materialism and insecurity may arise. Executives in the United States are lauded, no matter the 
means by which they reached their position. This creates a motivation for lesser employees to 
“win at all costs,” which may lead to white collar crime, especially in firms that do not have clear 
and enforced ethics policies (Leap 2007). 
Second, the lack of a sense of “wrongness” can contribute to white collar crime. White 
collar crime lacks the feeling of “wrongness” that other, more traditional crimes have (Feeley 
2006). When the concept was first formed, scholars still debated whether white collar crime 
could actually be called a crime (Sutherland 1940). In a previous study, when asked to rank the 
relative seriousness of crimes (white collar crimes, property crimes, violent crimes, etc.), people 
placed white collar crime at the less-serious end of the scale, with embezzlement ranked among 
the lowest in terms of seriousness (Feeley 2006). Additionally, the judicial and penal system 
supports this societal norm through the nearly non-existent punishment of white collar criminals. 
The average prison sentence for convicted white collar criminals was found to be 2.6 days (Vago 
2011).   
The Fraud Triangle 
These two concepts have been somewhat combined in an effort to create a holistic 
approach to the causes of white collar crime (Figure 1). The result of this effort is the white 
collar crime Fraud Triangle (Eaton and Korach 2016). The Fraud Triangle explains that there are 
three main causes that result in white collar crime: Opportunity, Motivation, and Rationalization 
(Eaton and Korach 2016). 
Opportunity is present in all firms, but the extent of the opportunity varies across 
industries. The concept of Motivation is supported by three separate theories. First, the theory of 
General Deterrence states that people will not commit crime simply because they don’t want any 
risk of jail time (Eaton and Korach 2016). This isn’t the same as weighing the pros and cons,  
 
 
 
 
 
because at this stage the potential criminal does not even consider the potential gains of the 
crime. The weighing of pros and cons is covered under the second theory: the theory of Rational 
Choice. Here, potential white collar criminals consider whether the rewards outweigh the risks 
(Eaton and Korach 2016). Finally, the General Strain theory comes into play. In this theory, even 
if the risks outweigh the rewards, actors decide to commit the crime if they’re attempting to 
reach an end goal and traditional, legal means are not getting them there (Eaton and Korach 
2016).  
Once the actors decide to commit the crime, the Rationalization side of the triangle takes 
effect. When a relatively good actor decides to take a bad action, there is a cognitive dissonance. 
Thus, the white collar criminal denies responsibility, denies harm, and denies the existence of a 
victim (Eaton and Korach 2016). It is easier for an occupational white collar criminal to deny 
harm and deny the existence of a victim than it is for a street criminal, given the nature of who 
the occupational criminal is stealing from. This concept of Rationalization is widely accepted by 
scholars in the field (Coleman 1985; Feeley 2006; Stadler and Benson 2012). Rationalization is 
made easier for white collar criminals due to the perceived lack of societal importance (Edelhertz 
and Overcast 1982). Simply put, people who commit white collar crimes do not consider 
 
Figure 1: The Fraud Triangle 
themselves criminals and are less likely to feel guilt over their actions (Edelhertz and Overcast 
1982; Stadler and Benson 2012). 
Potential Causes of Occupational Crime 
Additional potential causes of occupational crime within firms have been briefly explored 
by other scholars. Firstly, a lack of actual physical security can make the firm vulnerable to 
employee theft (Leap 2007). Secondly, poor accounting and financial controls can be taken 
advantage of. Without proper accounting and financial practices, embezzlement becomes a 
potential issue (Leap 2007).  Thirdly, poor board oversight can lead to unchecked decision-
making at the managerial level, which Sutherland postulates is the level at which white collar 
crime occurs (Leap 2007). Finally, a combination of job characteristics, organizational structure, 
and lack of accountability can weaken a firm. The large size of a firm may force a decentralized 
organizational structure. Increasing the complexity and decentralization of a firm increases the 
risk of white collar crime occurring (Feeley 2006; Leap 2007). When there is a lack of 
accountability, there is a lack of blame when white collar crime occurs, increasing the ability for 
the white collar criminal to rationalize and avoid the feeling of guilt.  
PROPOSED FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OCCUPATIONAL CRIME 
The Structure of the Organization 
Corporate Size 
 Corporate size related to organizational crime. Prior research has found that the size 
of a corporation has an effect on the likelihood of organizational crime (Dalton and Kesner 
1988). Clinard and Yeager (1980) state that an immensely sized corporation must, by necessity, 
delegate decision-making and establish complicated structures in order to function efficiently. It 
is the subsequent lack of personal responsibility for decisions that fosters an environment in 
which corporate criminality is possible (Clinard and Yeager 1980). In studying corporations 
against whom legal actions had been initiated, Clinard and Yeager found that “violations were 
far more likely to be committed by large corporations.” (Ermann and Lundman 2002, 91).  
Corporate size related to occupational crime. In looking at corporate size through the 
lens of the Fraud Triangle, this research finds that the size of an organization applies to the 
“opportunity” aspect of occupational crime. Organizations that are large in size tend to be 
decentralized. The larger the organization is, the more complex it becomes, and it is therefore 
easier to hide financial misdeeds in the books. As Sally Simpson and Nicole Piquero (2002) 
point out, opportunity is subjective. An opportunity only becomes available once the white collar 
criminal recognizes it as such. Therefore, once a firm reaches a particular, objectively 
indefinable size, the white collar criminal recognizes it to be complex enough to enable the 
commission of the offense without detection.  
However, the exact relationship between all forms of occupational crime and 
organizational size has yet to be defined. Kristy Holtfreter (2005) conducted a study on the 
relationship between victim company size and acts of asset misappropriation, corruption, and 
fraudulent statements. These three types of offenses all fall under the umbrella of occupational 
crime, as opposed to organizational crime. Holtfreter (2005) conducted a statistical analysis of 
data collected by certified fraud examiners, and found that firms who had fallen victim to 
corruption were large, for-profit entities, whereas firms who had fallen victim to asset 
misappropriation and fraudulent statements were smaller in size. Holtfreter’s findings, coupled 
with prior literature, suggest that size may play a role in creating opportunities for crime, but to a 
minor extent. That is, there may be greater opportunity for occupational crime in larger 
organizations, but the minimum size that a firm must be in order to create opportunity may be 
smaller for certain types of occupational crime.  
Inadequate Oversight 
Managerial and corporate board oversight is crucial to the prevention of white collar 
crime opportunity within a firm. The absence of sufficient checks and balances creates a firm 
that is rife with opportunities for a white collar criminal. Situations or scenarios that would not 
ordinarily be deemed criminal opportunities become such when a lack of credible oversight 
exists (Shover and Hochstetler 2006). Oftentimes, a lack of oversight stems from a disorganized 
or decentralized organizational structure (Simpson and Piquero 2002). Due to the potential 
impact of insufficient managerial oversight, numerous scholars have researched the effects of 
oversight on white collar crime (Simpson and Piquero 2002; Shover and Hochstetler 2006; 
Pearce and Snider 1995; Leap 2007; Clinard and Yeager 1980; Wickman and Dailey 1982).  
 Inadequate oversight related to organizational crime. Terry Leap (2007) argues that 
corporate boards are blamed for most corporate scandals due to the expectation that board 
members are to oversee the operations and management of the corporation. When a corporation 
commits an organizational crime, the responsibility lies on upper management and members of 
the board. Therefore, board members are responsible for monitoring upper management, upper 
management is responsible for monitoring middle management, and so on (Walsh and Seward 
1990). When board members and management show indifference, criminal decisions are more 
likely to occur (Shover and Hochstetler 2006).  
 Furthermore, in firms with a decentralized management structure, a diffusion of 
responsibility occurs. This diffusion can result in a divide between what the upper managers 
believe is being done and what is actually being done by lower level employees (Clinard and 
Yeager 1980). Alternatively, this diffusion can result in upper managers taking advantage of the 
lack of direct responsibility in order to internally rationalize the organizational crime being 
committed (Clinard and Yeager 1980). Therefore, the extent of the decentralization of a firm and 
the resulting absence of sufficient oversight can be a predictor of organizational crime (Holtfreter 
2005). 
 Inadequate oversight related to occupational crime. While existing research has 
focused solely on the failures of board oversight as applied to organizational crime, the absence 
of oversight can have a similar effect on those wishing to commit occupational crime. Pursuant 
to the research of Shover and Hochstetler (2006), a lack of credible oversight creates 
opportunities for criminal activities that would otherwise fail to exist, and as such applies to the 
“opportunity” side of the Fraud Triangle. If employees are able to commit crimes on behalf of 
the company without the company’s knowledge, the same is true of employees choosing to 
commit crimes against the company. Research shows that corporations who conduct internal 
audits are victimized to a lesser extent than corporations without the same degree of financial 
oversight (Shover and Hochstetler 2006).  
The Social Environment of the Organization 
Organizational Goals 
 Organizational goals related to organizational crime. Multiple scholars have 
suggested that the goals of an organization can lead to the commission of organizational 
offenses. Clinard and Yeager (1980) suggest that “the nature of corporate goals may promote 
marginal and illegal behavior” due to the applicability of the rational goal model (43). An 
increase in profits is a crucial element of a company’s economic success, and as such there is a 
strong desire by rational actors to either increase or maintain present levels of profitability 
(Clinard and Yeager 1980).  Ronald Kramer argues that “corporate criminality is related to the 
primary goal of business corporations in a capitalistic economy: profit maximization,” and notes 
that other studies have found “pressure for profits” to be the most common motivating factor 
behind white collar crime (Wickman and Dailey 1982, 81). Clinard and Yeager (1980) also 
identify other areas in which corporations have goals, such as expansion and prestige. However, 
regardless of the type of goal being pursued, be it profits or prestige, the means by which actors 
attempt to reach these goals remains inherently the same. Actors in organizations with strong 
corporate goals feel the pressure to succeed, even if succeeding means bending the rules.  
 Organizational goals related to occupational crime. Pursuant to Kramer’s research, 
corporate goals should thus be classified as a “motivation” with respect to the Fraud Triangle. 
The idea that an actor is motivated to behave illegally in order to reach the goals set forth by the 
corporation follows the General Strain theory (Eaton and Korach 2016). However, corporate 
goals are oftentimes inconsistent with occupational crime, as any sort of crime against the 
company would be contrary to the company’s success. Despite this apparent divide between 
occupational crime motivation and corporate goals, it is the unattainable nature of such goals that 
can motivate a white collar criminal. When organizational goals set forth by management are 
unrealistic and overly ambitious, individuals become motivated to commit fraud (Leap 2007).  
 
Organizational Morality 
 Organizational morality related to organizational crime. Another aspect of the social 
environment of a firm is the organization’s morality. In relation to organizational crime, scholars 
have found that the moral values of bad-acting organizations are unclear or subpar (Pearce and 
Snider 1995; Shover and Hochstetler 2006; Simpson and Piquero 2002). However, prior research 
has not yet considered the potential impact of organizational morality on occupational crime.  
 Yeager asserts that while “by themselves [codes of conduct] are entirely insufficient for 
meaningful reform of corporate ethics and legal compliance,” it is important for organizations to 
strengthen the moral voices of their managers (Pearce and Snider 1995, 162). Morality requires 
determinations of right and wrong in scenarios involving actions, and an absence of morality in a 
corporation results in a gap in the decision-making process. That is, actions that would 
reasonably be deemed “wrong” will not be labeled as such by the organizational actors. 
According to Edward Ross, “the key to the [white collar criminal] is not evil impulse, but moral 
insensibility.” (Ermann and Lundman 2002, 59). Without morality, immoral and illegal actions 
are more likely to occur.  
 Organizational morality related to occupational crime. The idea of organizational 
morality is difficult to define, but it is in essence the way in which companies influence the 
moral character of their employees (Pearce and Snider 1995). Organizations shape the morality 
of employees both from a business standpoint and more generally (Pearce and Snider 1995). As 
such, the organizational morality of a company contributes to the “rationalization” side of the 
Fraud Triangle. White collar crime offenses are usually “facilitated by a moral 
ambivalence…they can be readily justified.” (Croall 1992, 73). Therefore, the stronger the moral 
character of the employee, the more difficult it is for the employee to rationalize a “wrong” 
action. The difference between morality in making a decision for the company and in making a 
personal decision is indistinguishable. If an actor is guided by a moral compass when deciding to 
commit an organizational crime, that same guidance will occur when the actor is deciding to 
commit an occupational crime. A strong sense of morality does not disappear simply because the 
victim of the offense has changed. Neal Shover and Andy Hochstetler (2006) found that highly 
moral “good citizens” were deterred from white collar crime by what appeared to be their own 
inner morality, whereas participants who had low personal morality were only deterred from 
white collar crime once formal sanctions were introduced into the rational choice calculation.  
The Financial Status and Compensation Structure of the Organization 
Compensation Practices 
 Compensation practices related to organizational crime. Diana Bilimoria (1995) 
conducted research in an attempt to better understand what relationship, if any, exists between 
executive pay and organizational crime. Using a sample size of 91 Fortune 500 companies, 
Bilimoria classified each firm as either “owner controlled” or “management controlled.” Firms 
that were owner controlled were firms in which the shareholders controlled corporate policy, 
whereas managerial interests dominated management controlled organizations (Bilimoria 1995). 
In evaluating the relationship between managerial control, corporate crime, and compensation, 
Bilimoria utilized cash compensation as a figure for executive pay and a combination of legal 
filings and violation statistics as a figure for corporate crime. Her research found that a positive 
relationship exists between executive pay and corporate crime in management controlled 
organizations, but no such relationship exists in owner controlled organizations (Bilimoria 1995).  
However, Bilimoria’s research contains a relatively small sample size. Additionally, the 
study only partially accounts for the potential effects of organizational size on the prevalence of 
corporate crime. By studying only Fortune 500 companies, the study is unable to determine 
whether these same compensation effects are present in medium sized or smaller firms.  
Furthermore, by utilizing cash compensation as the only figure to describe executive pay, 
the values of stock options and other executive “perks” are not accounted for by Bilimoria 
(1995). The effects of stock options have the potential to be much stronger than those of cash 
compensation (Leap 2007). Research has found that executives of “violator” firms held stock 
options valued at three times their salaries, while executives of “good” firms held stock options 
worth roughly the same as their annual pay (Shover and Hochstetler 2006). Stock options are 
intended to align the goals of the executives with the goals of the company, but can instead be 
used in a way that completely contradicts the interests of the shareholders. When executives are 
issued stock options, some may decide to forgo efforts to build long-term profit stability and 
instead engage in risky, short-term strategies in order to inflate the share price. These short-term 
strategies may even include unethical or illegal practices (Leap 2007). Once the share price is 
temporarily higher, the executives will then sell their shares for enormous personal gain (Leap 
2007).  
 Compensation practices related to occupational crime. Based on existing research, 
executive compensation can be classified as a “motivation” facet of the Fraud Triangle. 
However, it would appear that this motivation exists only for executives receiving higher pay, as 
opposed to middle management and those in the lower echelons of the organization. The 
fraudulent behaviors surrounding share prices is undertaken by the executives themselves, and 
no research exists to support the claim that the organizational crime associated with executive 
pay stems from individuals other than the executives being compensated (Leap 2007; Bilimoria 
1995). In fact, Marshall Clinard (1983) finds that middle managers feel little to no resentment 
towards upper management due to executive compensation or perks. Most middle managers feel 
that upper level managers and executives were deserving of their higher pay, and believe that 
these perks create goals for them to reach (Clinard 1983). Because middle managers are not 
motivated by any sort of perception of compensation inequality, it cannot be presumed that 
executive compensation motivates through jealousy. However, because executive compensation 
serves as a goal for middle managers to work towards, the effects that goals have on 
occupational crime may come into effect. As discussed previously, the General Strain theory can 
result in illegal actions being taken when there exist no other legal routes to goal achievement. 
Middle managers may be willing to engage in unethical or illegal actions in order to gain status 
and promotion within the organization. Furthermore, the effects of general compensation (as 
opposed to executive compensation) have yet to be analyzed. While executives are motivated to 
commit occupational crime by a desire to increase compensation, it is perhaps the case that 
lower-level employees are motivated to commit occupational crimes by their own levels of 
compensation. The perks and benefits of stock options may not be present for all employees, but 
the desire to maintain status and personal financial stability exists in all levels of the organization 
(Shover and Hochstetler 2006). Coupled with external financial difficulties, a low salary can 
motivate an individual to commit occupational crime, simply because the opportunity to assuage 
personal financial struggles may exist only in the workplace (Shover and Hochstetler 2006).  
Financial Performance 
 Financial performance related to organizational crime. Existing literature 
demonstrates that there is a connection between the overall financial conditions of the firm and 
the likelihood of organizational crime (Clinard and Yeager 1980; Shover and Hochstetler 2006; 
Geis and Stotland 1980). Scholars have found that “firms with relatively poor or declining 
financial records may be more likely to violate certain laws that those whose economic 
performance is better…both industry and firm measures of financial performance [are] related to 
corporate violations.” (Clinard and Yeager 1980, 127-129). Not only are firms in struggling 
industries more likely to engage in corporate crime, but struggling firms in prosperous industries 
are also more likely to violate the law (Clinard and Yeager 1980). The pressure to make a profit 
and cut costs causes middle managers to engage in illegal behaviors on behalf of the company 
(Clinard 1983).  
 Financial performance related to occupational crime. While the relationship between 
the pressure of financial performance and organizational crime is well established, the 
relationship between firm revenue and occupational crime remains unclear. While existing 
research suggests a positive correlation between financially struggling firms and occupational 
crime, Holtfreter (2005) notes that this correlation could merely be the result of increased 
scrutiny during periods of financial difficulty. Since occupational crime is only measured once it 
has been detected, the levels of occupational crime in times of financial prosperity are less 
reliable. Typically, firms conduct extensive audits when the company is struggling, as opposed to 
when the company is thriving (Holtfreter 2005). Therefore, an accurate measure of occupational 
crime in firms with strong financial performance does not presently exist. It could be the case 
that there is an equally high level of occupational crime in successful firms that simply has yet to 
be detected. 
 In theory, financial performance could motivate occupational crime in two ways. Firstly, 
poor financial performance could motivate the individual to commit crime, as poor financial 
performance could be coupled with societal economic difficulties. Secondly, strong financial 
performance could motivate the individual to commit occupational crime in order to compensate 
for personal financial difficulties. When firms are successful, it becomes easier for the white 
collar criminal to deny harm to the victim (Eaton and Korach 2016). However, these potential 
effects of financial performance are merely speculative and rely upon external environmental 
factors. As such, while financial performance of the firm may play a role in the motivations of 
organizational crime, it cannot be concluded that the financial performance of the firm plays a 
direct role in the motivations of occupational crime.  
DISCUSSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research identifies three primary areas within the firm that have the potential to 
contribute to occupational crime: the organizational structure of the firm, the social environment 
of the firm, and the financial structure of the firm. Within those three realms, corporate size, 
insufficient oversight, organizational goals, organizational morality, and compensation are found 
to fit at least one of three aspects of the Fraud Triangle. Financial performance may potentially 
play a role in motivating occupational crime, but since a lack of data makes the connection 
tenuous, it has not been included in the overall summary of contributing factors.  
In analyzing the factors set forth in the previous sections, it becomes apparent that the 
factors contributing to occupational crime are both structural and social in nature. Some factors, 
such as corporate goals, are relatively easily aspect for the organization to adjust. Others, such as 
corporate size, are not. This research suggests that a better way to understand corporate crime is 
to tease out the ways in which structural and social elements of a company interact with the 
Fraud Triangle. By creating six categories of firm-related factors (Figure 2), organizations may 
be better able to address the ways in which they internally combat occupational crime. These six 
categories are structural opportunity, structural motivation, structural rationalization, social 
opportunity, social motivation, and social rationalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 This research has identified corporate size and a lack of credible oversight as factors that 
may provide opportunities for occupational crime (Figure 3). Both of these areas are structural in 
nature, and stem from the formal organization of the firm. This research has also identified 
compensation and organizational goals as factors that contribute to the motivation of 
occupational crime (Figure 3). The ways in which executives are compensated are structural. 
However, it is important to note the difference between formally stated organizational goals and 
perceived organizational goals. Actual goals given by upper management are structural in nature 
– these goals are formally a part of the organization. The way in which goals are perceived by 
other employees is social in nature – the effect that these goals have on the motivations of those 
who must achieve them is an effect that can be manipulated through social interaction. Thus, 
organizational goals as a whole fall under both the structural and social motivation categories. 
Finally, organizational morality has been identified as an aspect of the organization that either 
promotes or impedes the ability of a white collar criminal to rationalize the decision to commit 
Figure 2: Proposed Firm-Related Factor Classification System 
an occupational crime (Figure 3). Because the way in which morality is learned within the 
company is through social interaction, organizational morality has been classified as a social 
rationalization element.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ultimately, this depiction of occupational crime causal factors demonstrates the 
importance of internal compliance programs and ethical codes. By highlighting areas in which 
firms can concentrate resources in an effort to more efficiently combat both organizational and 
occupational crime, this research allows organizations to potentially decrease the costs associated 
with white collar crime. The costs associated with internal compliance programs are expected to 
increase annually, making it all the more important for organizations to target aspects of their 
firms that have actual impact on illegal behavior (English and Hammond 2016). Further research 
should attempt to analyze the efficiency of internal compliance programs in addressing white 
collar crime concerns. Additionally, a lack of reliable data in this field can result uncertainty as 
to the accuracy of conclusions drawn by occupational crime theorists. Presently, occupational 
crime data is centered on characteristics of the perpetrators and their psychology (Ragatz, 
Fremouw, and Baker 2012). Further research would be benefitted by an accumulation of data on 
Figure 3: The Classifications of Firm-Related Factors 
the characteristics of victim organizations. This research highlights the need for a wide variety of 
information on victim firms, beyond the basics of profits and size.  
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